Sobchak Security

Era tutta una copertura per coltivare e trafficare oppio! Probabilmente quel vecchio era un operativo della CIA e l’allegra famigliola gestiva tutta la baracca.

Ecco perche’ chi consumava quel minestrone soffriva di strane allucinazioni.

Grazie Grande Puffo!

By David J. Rude and Daniel E. Williams

Un ottimo articolo, scritto a quattro mani da due aviatori dell’US Army, che esamina da vicino l’impiego degli elicotteri AH-64 in Iraq. 

Recent actions in Iraq by the Vipers, 1st Battalion (Attack), 3rd Aviation Regiment, marked the first time that the AH-64D Longbow Apache was employed in combat. The Vipers fired the first radar frequency Longbow Hellfire missile used in combat against the observation posts along the Hi Kuwaiti/Iraqi border-the first direct fire shots of the ground war-and obtained a direct hit along with 13 other conventional missiles. The Vipers also killed the first tank (T-54) in the vicinity of Nasiriyah with a Longbow. It was in these early days that the Longbow was used in much the same way that our counterparts in the Marine Corps were using them-in close combat attacks, or CCA, in support of ground forces. The aircraft works as advertised, particularly when used to enhance the ground scheme of maneuver. The Viper battalion’s Longbows destroyed everything we were tasked to destroy and much more, and we never dropped a single mission, including medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) escort and no-notice quick reaction force missions in support of ground units. In the joint scheme of operations, units of the 3rd Infantry Division’s Aviation Brigade and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force operated in concert exceptionally well to manage airspace, share limited airfield resources and defeat the 11th Iraqi Infantry Division.

The fight that raged around us in the opening days of the ground war was not at all like Desert Storm. Enemy air defenses and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) units had demonstrated adaptability and improvements in tactics, especially in their ability to target attack helicopters, since then. The enemy placed weapon systems beneath tree lines and palm canopies, and they tucked them into urban areas to exploit Apache vulnerabilities. On more than one occasion, the enemy employed an obviously lucrative target, a T-55 or T-72 tank, in the open as bait, with the expectation of drawing Apache helicopters into an air defense ambush. Near many ambush positions, observer teams in Arab civilian attire triangulated aircraft locations and directed mortar and anti-aircraft artillery fires.

The battlefield had changed as well. Our aviators flew into battle expecting to fight Iraq’s fielded military forces, mainly armor and artillery, in the open desert. After all, the Apache had proven itself in open desert combat like that 12 years ago. In 2003, however, the Iraqis tucked their conventional weaponry inside city blocks, among family dwellings and behind human shields.

In past Warfighter simulation exercises, Apache battalions had been employed predominantly against lucrative, high-payoff targets in the corps and division deep battle space. For years, these deep, shaping operations to eliminate these targets before they could affect a brigade combat team’s scheme of maneuver were often debated as the only viable mission for Army Apaches.

In fact, Army Apaches were often restricted from operating in close fights during simulation exercises simply because their icons would instead achieve glorified success in the deep fight by killing all of the red icons-a dangerous assumption against the enemy we found in contemporary Iraq. The Apache’s capabilities were not adequately replicated in simulations software, which often skewed their capabilities in real combat.

To complicate the Apache’s role in deep operations, fighter jets performing the killbox interdiction close air support (KICAS) function on the battlefield often presented the ground commander with better options by mitigating tactical risk to aircrews and circumventing the enemy’s air defense network, as experienced both during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in this war in Iraq. Even the armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is infringing upon the Apache’s fragile foothold in deep operations.

So why not aggressively bring Apaches back into the close fight during the 21st century? AH-IG Huey-Cobra gunships conducted close combat attacks successfully in the Vietnam conflict. Recently, Apaches in Afghanistan achieved success directly supporting ground troops. Even Marine Corps aviation units have firmly indoctrinated their AH-1W Cobras into the close fight to support ground units in contact. The Army, on the other hand, has purposefully shunned the Apache’s role in the close combat attack, or CCA, for years.

In addition, we have been taught to rely entirely too much upon intelligence gathering systems that did not seem to help us visualize the enemy in Iraq. While conducting close combat attacks against enemy forces who had pinned down a friendly ground convoy southeast of Nasiriyah, a Longbow Apache team from 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, came under fire from ground mounted anti-tank (AT) weapons. The dismounted weapons were concealed along a road in a vehicular ambush position. They were transported by and set in close proximity to civilian pick-up trucks. After evading the direct fires of two AT missiles fired at their aircraft, the hunter-killer team returned fire and destroyed four AT systems with a combination of semi-active laser K Model Hellfire missiles and 30 mm cannon fires. Suddenly, a large, Russian-looking, canvas-covered truck moved near the unfolding carnage. Without warning, concealed troops in the back ripped away the canvas cover and sprayed small arms fire at the aircraft, forcing the hunter-killer team to engage and destroy the truck and hostile troops. As in the vignette above, the enemy established ambush positions to hit our convoys moving north into zone.

They used unconventional tactics, outside the box, to attack our weaknesses. It was difficult to determine who was friendly and who was not. Often the enemy and civilians we faced were one and the same. The Iraqi soldiers were often clad in civilian attire, not uniforms. For instance, as one Iraqi man, standing atop a bridge, raised his hands while holding up a white flag to surrender, there were others firing anti-tank missiles at our helicopters from positions just a few meters away. It was a deliberate trap. These Iraqis were very cunning, and they employed guerrilla tactics against both our ground and airborne platforms. They were neither surrendering nor capitulating. The war rapidly shifted to fights against terrorists, and it slowly dragged us into guerrilla tactics not seen since Vietnam. There was no conventional, open desert fight as there was in Desert Storm. Saddam had been using school buses, ambulances and other seemingly sacred vehicles to move troops and terrorists. he embedded command, control and communications nodes within schools, mosques and hospitals. he brutalized any Iraqis who showed support for coalition efforts in Iraq.

We were not fighting tanks in this war. Apaches were not sent after division artillery groups or large mechanized or armored formations in engagement areas. The enemy was not arrayed as such. Instead, Saddam cultivated the fight close to his cities and forced our troops into urban warfare to instigate civilian and collateral damage with the intention of blaming us and swaying world opinion against us. Furthermore, gaps in intelligence coverage during Operation Iraqi Freedom prevented us from attaining the realtime ability to track definitive enemy activity; therefore, there were no enemy-driven decision points or triggers to launch Apaches to shape the indistinct battle space in front of ground commanders. UAVs were not available, and we simply did not have the means to detect, locate or track high-payoff target sets that would enable the commitment of our attack helicopter companies in a “Warfighter” maximum destruction attack at a decisive point. This is not, however, to be construed to mean that the Apache has no role or is incapable of effective combat operations in such a battlefield environment.

As the enemy’s situation template became urban-centric instead of Soviet doctrine-based, with a conventional force in the open desert, the mission focus of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, transformed from massed battalion, or phased attacks against armor and artillery to continuous close combat attacks in support of the division’s main effort brigade combat team (BCT). During execution, the battalion routinely employed en route combat maneuvers and close combat maneuvers to enhance aircrew maneuverability and survivability through sustained running fire tactics, avoiding the infamous hover-fire trap from a targeted battle position. Due to the concentrated AAA and small arms threats all over the Iraqi battlefield, the battalion’s aircraft always fought in teams, and we refrained from launching single Apaches in combat operations. The lead aircraft focused eyes and fires out to their point-target killing range while wingmen provided local security for the team. The battalion commander, operating from an AH-64D, also provided local security behind the attack helicopter company in contact, and for the Aviation Brigade’s command and control UH-60. Companies maintained back-up aircraft at the same readiness condition as the mission aircraft until the time of launch to preclude missing a mission.

The battalion achieved notable success during this type of war by developing and executing a security “ring of steel” around key terrain to clear it and then transitioning to close combat support for an advancing ground force. This concept centered upon a terrain-oriented objective, and the operation commenced with reconnaissance by fire to clear enemy direct fire weapon systems within a two-kilometer circle around the objective. AH-64s then shifted immediately to a four-kilometer circle around the objective to destroy enemy direct and indirect weapons systems. Once that area was cleared by AH-64s, responsibility for clearance of fires in that area shifted to the advancing ground task force commander. At that time, the Apaches focused reconnaissance and fires to an outer, eight-kilometer ring to protect the ground force. As an example of this concept, the battalion initially cleared the two inner circles around a bridge that was to be seized by a 3rd Brigade Combat Team armored task force. Once the task force closed to within their organic direct fire range of the bridge, the aircraft shifted to an outer security ring and focused their eyes on major avenues of approach to deny enemy counterattack forces from affecting bridge crossing operations.

The fast-paced operational tempo required the battalion to be continually postured to launch an Apache company within a 30-minute window, from the start of the ground war through the duration of combat operations culminating in the seizure of Saddam International Airport. We maintained a standing “be prepared” mission to conduct security in support of contingency operations for the duration of the war. In addition, the battalion routinely provided security for MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation aircraft that transitioned between the front and ambulatory exchange points. We also supported downed aircraft recovery teams or immediate personnel recovery missions in support of the Aviation Brigade.

For sustainability and depth, we maintained the next-up company on a two-hour launch string, while keeping the third company down for future contingencies. During operational missions in support of a BCT in contact, the battalion conducted continuous rotations of two attack helicopter companies for six to eight hour blocks to support the ground commander’s fight against the Republican Guard Medina Division. Meanwhile, we retained the third company in a forward assembly area on a reduced readiness condition that afforded aircrews an opportunity to rest. This third company provided the battalion the flexibility to conduct subsequent contingencies in support of the division. When the battalion was not operationally controlled by a BCT, the attack companies rotated in eight-hour cycles on a 30-minute launch string over a 24-hour period to quickly respond to reconnaissance and security mission requirements, some of which required only one team of two AH-64Ds. Through this tactical employment methodology, we were always able to launch teams of Apaches to perform zone reconnaissance missions and security operations, and conduct close combat attacks in support of ground forces on call. Moreover, this eight-hour fighter management cycle by company provided responsive, sustainable support to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), where continuous operations and on-station times far exceeded the requirement for mass throughout the war.

In the weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the battalion worked in concert with each BCT to test and validate combat and thermal identification panels (CIP/TIP) with the primary objective of mitigating the risk of air-to-ground fratricide during close combat operations. The CIP and tip integration on combat vehicles and our weapons tight philosophy resulted in zero air-to-ground fratricide incidents in the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) battle space. However, the Apache’s current forward-looking infrared (FLIR) provides target identification, even with CIPs and TIPs, out to only 3.0 kilometers, well short of its point target killing range. Fielding the latest generation FLIR, a must-have for the Longbow Apache to identify targets beyond 3.0 kilometers and further mitigate air-to-ground fratricide, and integrating two-way, real-time friendly blue icons onto a moving map display on the Longbow’s tactical situation display, will further enhance the Longbow Apache’s role in the close fight in the next war. Whether in shaping the battle in a combined arms War-fighter-type fight where intelligence of the enemy is known, or by conducting close combat attacks in direct support of a ground commander, the Longbow Apache provides significantly increased flexibility and firepower for U.S. Army forces, and will do so for years to come.

MAJ. DAVID J. RUDE is assigned to the 1st Battalion (Attack), 3rd Aviation Regiment, where he served as the battalion S-3 operations officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was commissioned in the Aviation branch through the ROTC Green-to-Gold program at Cameron University, Lawton, Okla. LT. COL. DANIEL E. WILLIAMS is the commander of 1st Battalion (Attack), 3rd Aviation Regiment, home stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga. He is a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and was commissioned into the Aviation branch.

Copyright Association of the United States Army July 2003
All rights Reserved

A volte lo amo, a volte lo odio, ma e’ sempre lui, Matt Taibbi, ovvero quello che i vari Giulietto Chiesa e Riso Gallo Blondet vorrebbero essere.

Iraq, Ce$pugli, Contractor$ e $perperi a$$ortiti. Un articolo, sponsorizzato dalla O$ram, piu’ Illuminante di un bengala lanciato nel pieno della notte.

http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/16076312/the_great_iraq_swindle

Buona lettura.

“Operation Iraqi Freedom, it turns out, was never a war against Saddam ­Hussein’s Iraq. It was an invasion of the federal budget, and no occupying force in history has ever been this efficient.”

Eh si, i gatti! O meglio, i cuccioli di gatto.

L’avreste mai detto?

A quanto pare i felini iracheni di sesso femminile amano figliare all’interno delle fuoristrada Humvees, specie quelle parcheggiate nei motorpool.

“It’s a disease… well, a sweet disease”, ha commentato una giovane sergente.

C’e’ anche chi si e’ improvvisato “mamma gatta”, allattando cuccioli con minibiberon ricavati da flaconcini vuoti di collirio, come questo soldato:

I GIs pero’ non sembrano affatto disturbati da queste inaspettate visite, a giudicare dalle numerose adozioni.

Uno degli autoparchi dove le gatte vanno a partorire. Cheeeeese… aspetta… e’ un gatto, non un topo!

Questo micio preferisce la pennichella alla lettura di Stars and Stripes

Il riposo dei guerrieri: siesta nel bunker

Cats at war. Questo gatto deve essersi addormentato durante il turno di guardia…

In campio aviatorio invece, pare che il velivolo favorito sia l’elicottero birotore CH-47 Chinook.

Non mi stupisco: i gatti amano la comodita’, e il Chinook e’ certamente un mezzo molto spazioso:

Si, lo so, esistono posti piu’ comodi, ma puo’ sempre andare peggio:

Hog DOG, Giorgino, Hot DOG!!!!!

Octofoil era la rivista ufficiale della 9a Divisione di Fanteria in Vietnam. La pubblicazione era corredata di splendide fotografie, molte delle quali a colori, e reports dalla zona di combattimento. Qui una selezione di immagini tratte da alcuni numeri pubblicati fra il 1967 e il 1969.

La citazione del Blues deriva dal fatto che la 9a Divisione, durante la permanenza in Vietnam, tendeva a reclutare gli uomini fra gli stati meridionali caratterizzati da ampie zone paludose come le Everglades della Florida o il Delta del Mississippi, ambienti simili agli acquitrini del Mekong, dove operava la III Brigata. Per tale ragione la presenza di truppe afroamericane era sensibilmente piu’ elevata rispetto ad altre unita’. Mentre i bianchi erano tradizionalmente legati a Country e Honky Tonk, i neri preferivano ascoltare Blues e Soul. Il Rock and Roll comunque metteva tutti d’accordo

Quelli della 9a in Vietnam erano anche chiamati i Marines dell’Esercito.

Combat tracker con il suo fedele amico a quattro zampe. Le unita’ speciali erano in genere armate con le versioni compatte dell’M16, come questa Colt XM177E2 Commando (clicca x ingrandire)

La 9a operava con la III Brigata nel Delta del Mekong

Combat trackers in avanscoperta

Combat tracker e cane erano compagni inseparabili

Il Bob Hope Show era l’evento piu’ atteso dai GIs in Vietnam

Belle ragazze, musica e umorismo erano i principali ingredienti del Bob Hope Show. Bob Hope, di origine inglese, e’ stato probabilmente il personaggio piu’ amato dalle truppe americane. La sua totale devozione al soldato medio, lontana da politica ed ideologia, lo aveva reso immediatamente celebre e popolare in tutti i servizi delle Forze Armate. Intrattenne i soldati americani in ben quattro guerre: 2a Guerra Mondiale, Corea, Vietnam e Desert Storm (quasi noventenne!). Hope e’ morto in pace e serenita’ nel 2003, pochi mesi dopo aver compiuto 100 anni. Gli americani, in segno di riconoscimento gli dedicarono una nave, la USS Bob Hope e un aeroporto, quello di Burbank, in California.

Pattuglia al tramonto nell’acquitrinio del Mekong

Nonostante gli orrori della guerra, la spiritualita’ fra le truppe americane non era mai trascurata come dimostra questa immagine

Il comandante in capo delle forze USA in Vietnam, Generale William C. Westmoreland, mentre imbraccia un fucile di precisione Mosin-Nagant catturato ai Vietcong dalla 9a Divisione

Il fango era una costante per i fanti della III brigata

La 9a Divisione di Fanteria era equipaggiata con mezzi all’avanguardia come elicotteri, hovercraft e pesanti imbarcazioni da assalto fluviale. Qualche volta pero’ gli uomini dovevano spostarsi attraverso rudimentali canoe e sampan, esattamente come il nemico

Dannati canali!

“Mud, fuckin’mud”

Gli uomini della III brigata conducevano sovente operazioni di sbarco fluviale a bordo di mezzi LCM6 modificati

Cavalleggeri mentre ispezionano un lotto di armi catturate. Notare la massiccia presenza di fucili a ripetizione manuale tipo Mosin-Nagant. A dispetto delle credenze, l’AK-47 non era molto diffuso fra i partigiani, almeno durante i primi anni di guerra

L’airboat era una delle imbarcazioni piu’ atipiche che s’incontravano nel Delta. Il pescaggio assai ridotto ne consentiva l’impiego nei fondali piu’ bassi

Questa immagine dimostra in quali condizioni gli uomini della Nona dovevano operare…

…ammollo, dalla mattina alla sera.

Il PACV (Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle) era un veicolo a cuscino d’aria prodotto dalla Bell durante gli anni sessanta. Era in dotazione in via sperimentale nella US Navy e nella 9^ Divisione di Fanteria, dove serviva nel 39° Plotone Cavalleria in compiti di esplorazione e supporto di fuoco, spesso in congiunzione con elicannoniere Huey ed elicotteri da osservazione LOacH. A quanto risulta dalla storiografia, fu il primo e unico impiego dell’hovercraft in operazioni belliche offensive. L’armamento - nella versione dell’Esercito - comprendeva mitragliatrici calibro .50 Browning, lanciagranate automatici da 40mm e mitragliatrici da 7,62 tipo M60

“I worry now about what will happen if George W. Bush gets elected president, because I think that we’re on the verge of some serious change, and it won’t be real good. Another Bush, another war, and this time will be worst. I keep hoping that Colin Powell will get elected. It will take a nonpolitician to save us from the politicians who will eventually destroy us.” - November 1999, Los Angeles, CA

On Iraq, Hartford, Connecticut, December 2002, three months before US-UK invasion

“I feel very proud and blessed to be American. My stance against entering a war that I believe is based on greed has nothing to do with how I feel about my beloved country. I have to question the intentions of those considering taking our young men and women into a war based on fear and greed. There will be no positive outcome from this. We will live through tremendous loss of life with the outcome being comparable to Vietnam, where we wake up as a nation and ask why did we allow ourselves to get dragged into a political war that could never be won, if won is even an applicable term.”

“Our lives, our actions, our deeds are all based on intention. We must investigate what those are. Really investigate. This is not about seeking revenge for 9-11. This is not about protecting our country from terrorism.”

“We, as a people, are being bullied by fear tactics into believing this has anything to do with protecting our country from attack. I have to leave i up to you as intelligent people to dig for your own information on that subject because it is wide and deep and you will not be able to come to sound conclusions unless you are open-minded enough to go outside of the norm of the controlled press we are fed everyday. NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO GO TO SLEEP. Our culture is choosing to do just that because the issues are too much to comprehend. The attacks on 9-11 were forewarned. They had nothing to do with Saddam Hussein. And while Saddam is an evil person, the strategy of “Let’s hit him before he hits us” is not a viable solution to anything. Terrorist attacks will continue as a reaction to the hate felt for our country.“

L’Olanda, la civile e liberale Olanda, ha sei, dico SEI elicotteri d’attacco AH-64 Apache in Afghanistan! E prima li aveva inviati anche in Iraq, Djibouti e Bosnia! Yeah, IFOR/SFOR! Mi piacerebbe sapere cosa ne pensano Spena e soci, ammesso che ne siano al corrente.

Di che parlo? Ma di questa recente uscita del signor Russo Spena:

“Al ministro Parisi diciamo chiaramente che avvertiamo il governo: non cerchi di ciurlare nel manico, se accedera’ alle richieste dei militari di inviare in Afghanistan gli elicotteri Mangusta, che sono senza dubbio armi offensive e non di difesa, noi diremo seccamente no, nel rispetto del decreto e degli ordini del giorno che abbiamo approvato”.

Tralasciando i patetici distinguo fra armi “d’attacco” e da “difesa”, stavo pensando, ma non sono da poco stati spesi fiori di quattrini per aggiornare i Mangusta? Per renderli meglio idonei ad operare negli scenari attuali? Probabilmente questi signori preferiscono lasciarli a prendere ruggine a Miramare di Rimini.

I Mangusta non sono nuovi alle operazioni all’estero, li abbiamo visti recentemente in Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo e Iraq, ma il loro debutto avvenne durante la missione UNOSOM Ibis in Somalia. Sissignori, durante un’operazione di “pace”.

Checkpoint Pasta? Do you remember? Ok, vi rinfresco la memoria con questo estratto:

“Un gruppo di somali, intanto, riesce ad impossessarsi di un VM. Una decina, forse più, salgono a bordo del gippone, esultano, fuggono via con il loro bottino. Vengono immediatamente individuati da un elicottero Mangusta; il puntatore li inquadra e chiede l’autorizzazione a sparare. “Negativo” Rispondono alla radio dal Comando. Le imprecazioni riecheggiano nell’interfono, adesso il gippone sparisce nel dedalo di viuzze del quartiere. Ma il pilota dell’elicottero non ci sta, non molla la preda. Vola radente sfiorando i tetti delle case, sapendo che le armi leggere dei somali possono poco contro la blindatura del velivolo. Poco dopo riavvista il mezzo e l’A-129 s’inclina, inquadra il bersaglio, chiede di nuovo l’autorizzazione al fuoco. Questa volta I’ “Okay” arriva subito. Non tanto però da anticipare il missile TOW che ha già colpito il bersaglio, distruggendolo con tutti gli occupanti.”

Era il 2 Luglio 1993.

Source

P.S: il VM catturato era armato di calibro .50
P.S.2: in una situazione analoga il pilota oggi avrebbe usato la 20mm di bordo, purtroppo all’epoca il Mangusta ne era privo (indovinate un po’ perche’)

Ritornando al discorso iniziale, quando un governo proroga una missione all’estero, deve fare quanto in suo potere per fornire agli uomini i mezzi e gli equipaggiamenti necessari, affinche’ essi possano espletare i loro compiti nel migliore dei modi (poi ci sarebbe il discorso delle RoE, ma questa e’ un’altra storia). In conclusione, voler negare una manciata di elicotteri per ipocrite questioni etico/politiche e’ da farsa, completa farsa. Il guaio e’ che qualcuno proprio non ci arriva.

Riguardo a Spena, dovrebbe fare una visitina a questo sito e schiarirsi le idee.

Un Apache olandese ritratto a Kandahar nel 2006 (Source: NATO)

Il Mangusta della discordia.