Sobchak Security

By David J. Rude and Daniel E. Williams

Un ottimo articolo, scritto a quattro mani da due aviatori dell’US Army, che esamina da vicino l’impiego degli elicotteri AH-64 in Iraq. 

Recent actions in Iraq by the Vipers, 1st Battalion (Attack), 3rd Aviation Regiment, marked the first time that the AH-64D Longbow Apache was employed in combat. The Vipers fired the first radar frequency Longbow Hellfire missile used in combat against the observation posts along the Hi Kuwaiti/Iraqi border-the first direct fire shots of the ground war-and obtained a direct hit along with 13 other conventional missiles. The Vipers also killed the first tank (T-54) in the vicinity of Nasiriyah with a Longbow. It was in these early days that the Longbow was used in much the same way that our counterparts in the Marine Corps were using them-in close combat attacks, or CCA, in support of ground forces. The aircraft works as advertised, particularly when used to enhance the ground scheme of maneuver. The Viper battalion’s Longbows destroyed everything we were tasked to destroy and much more, and we never dropped a single mission, including medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) escort and no-notice quick reaction force missions in support of ground units. In the joint scheme of operations, units of the 3rd Infantry Division’s Aviation Brigade and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force operated in concert exceptionally well to manage airspace, share limited airfield resources and defeat the 11th Iraqi Infantry Division.

The fight that raged around us in the opening days of the ground war was not at all like Desert Storm. Enemy air defenses and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) units had demonstrated adaptability and improvements in tactics, especially in their ability to target attack helicopters, since then. The enemy placed weapon systems beneath tree lines and palm canopies, and they tucked them into urban areas to exploit Apache vulnerabilities. On more than one occasion, the enemy employed an obviously lucrative target, a T-55 or T-72 tank, in the open as bait, with the expectation of drawing Apache helicopters into an air defense ambush. Near many ambush positions, observer teams in Arab civilian attire triangulated aircraft locations and directed mortar and anti-aircraft artillery fires.

The battlefield had changed as well. Our aviators flew into battle expecting to fight Iraq’s fielded military forces, mainly armor and artillery, in the open desert. After all, the Apache had proven itself in open desert combat like that 12 years ago. In 2003, however, the Iraqis tucked their conventional weaponry inside city blocks, among family dwellings and behind human shields.

In past Warfighter simulation exercises, Apache battalions had been employed predominantly against lucrative, high-payoff targets in the corps and division deep battle space. For years, these deep, shaping operations to eliminate these targets before they could affect a brigade combat team’s scheme of maneuver were often debated as the only viable mission for Army Apaches.

In fact, Army Apaches were often restricted from operating in close fights during simulation exercises simply because their icons would instead achieve glorified success in the deep fight by killing all of the red icons-a dangerous assumption against the enemy we found in contemporary Iraq. The Apache’s capabilities were not adequately replicated in simulations software, which often skewed their capabilities in real combat.

To complicate the Apache’s role in deep operations, fighter jets performing the killbox interdiction close air support (KICAS) function on the battlefield often presented the ground commander with better options by mitigating tactical risk to aircrews and circumventing the enemy’s air defense network, as experienced both during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in this war in Iraq. Even the armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is infringing upon the Apache’s fragile foothold in deep operations.

So why not aggressively bring Apaches back into the close fight during the 21st century? AH-IG Huey-Cobra gunships conducted close combat attacks successfully in the Vietnam conflict. Recently, Apaches in Afghanistan achieved success directly supporting ground troops. Even Marine Corps aviation units have firmly indoctrinated their AH-1W Cobras into the close fight to support ground units in contact. The Army, on the other hand, has purposefully shunned the Apache’s role in the close combat attack, or CCA, for years.

In addition, we have been taught to rely entirely too much upon intelligence gathering systems that did not seem to help us visualize the enemy in Iraq. While conducting close combat attacks against enemy forces who had pinned down a friendly ground convoy southeast of Nasiriyah, a Longbow Apache team from 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, came under fire from ground mounted anti-tank (AT) weapons. The dismounted weapons were concealed along a road in a vehicular ambush position. They were transported by and set in close proximity to civilian pick-up trucks. After evading the direct fires of two AT missiles fired at their aircraft, the hunter-killer team returned fire and destroyed four AT systems with a combination of semi-active laser K Model Hellfire missiles and 30 mm cannon fires. Suddenly, a large, Russian-looking, canvas-covered truck moved near the unfolding carnage. Without warning, concealed troops in the back ripped away the canvas cover and sprayed small arms fire at the aircraft, forcing the hunter-killer team to engage and destroy the truck and hostile troops. As in the vignette above, the enemy established ambush positions to hit our convoys moving north into zone.

They used unconventional tactics, outside the box, to attack our weaknesses. It was difficult to determine who was friendly and who was not. Often the enemy and civilians we faced were one and the same. The Iraqi soldiers were often clad in civilian attire, not uniforms. For instance, as one Iraqi man, standing atop a bridge, raised his hands while holding up a white flag to surrender, there were others firing anti-tank missiles at our helicopters from positions just a few meters away. It was a deliberate trap. These Iraqis were very cunning, and they employed guerrilla tactics against both our ground and airborne platforms. They were neither surrendering nor capitulating. The war rapidly shifted to fights against terrorists, and it slowly dragged us into guerrilla tactics not seen since Vietnam. There was no conventional, open desert fight as there was in Desert Storm. Saddam had been using school buses, ambulances and other seemingly sacred vehicles to move troops and terrorists. he embedded command, control and communications nodes within schools, mosques and hospitals. he brutalized any Iraqis who showed support for coalition efforts in Iraq.

We were not fighting tanks in this war. Apaches were not sent after division artillery groups or large mechanized or armored formations in engagement areas. The enemy was not arrayed as such. Instead, Saddam cultivated the fight close to his cities and forced our troops into urban warfare to instigate civilian and collateral damage with the intention of blaming us and swaying world opinion against us. Furthermore, gaps in intelligence coverage during Operation Iraqi Freedom prevented us from attaining the realtime ability to track definitive enemy activity; therefore, there were no enemy-driven decision points or triggers to launch Apaches to shape the indistinct battle space in front of ground commanders. UAVs were not available, and we simply did not have the means to detect, locate or track high-payoff target sets that would enable the commitment of our attack helicopter companies in a “Warfighter” maximum destruction attack at a decisive point. This is not, however, to be construed to mean that the Apache has no role or is incapable of effective combat operations in such a battlefield environment.

As the enemy’s situation template became urban-centric instead of Soviet doctrine-based, with a conventional force in the open desert, the mission focus of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, transformed from massed battalion, or phased attacks against armor and artillery to continuous close combat attacks in support of the division’s main effort brigade combat team (BCT). During execution, the battalion routinely employed en route combat maneuvers and close combat maneuvers to enhance aircrew maneuverability and survivability through sustained running fire tactics, avoiding the infamous hover-fire trap from a targeted battle position. Due to the concentrated AAA and small arms threats all over the Iraqi battlefield, the battalion’s aircraft always fought in teams, and we refrained from launching single Apaches in combat operations. The lead aircraft focused eyes and fires out to their point-target killing range while wingmen provided local security for the team. The battalion commander, operating from an AH-64D, also provided local security behind the attack helicopter company in contact, and for the Aviation Brigade’s command and control UH-60. Companies maintained back-up aircraft at the same readiness condition as the mission aircraft until the time of launch to preclude missing a mission.

The battalion achieved notable success during this type of war by developing and executing a security “ring of steel” around key terrain to clear it and then transitioning to close combat support for an advancing ground force. This concept centered upon a terrain-oriented objective, and the operation commenced with reconnaissance by fire to clear enemy direct fire weapon systems within a two-kilometer circle around the objective. AH-64s then shifted immediately to a four-kilometer circle around the objective to destroy enemy direct and indirect weapons systems. Once that area was cleared by AH-64s, responsibility for clearance of fires in that area shifted to the advancing ground task force commander. At that time, the Apaches focused reconnaissance and fires to an outer, eight-kilometer ring to protect the ground force. As an example of this concept, the battalion initially cleared the two inner circles around a bridge that was to be seized by a 3rd Brigade Combat Team armored task force. Once the task force closed to within their organic direct fire range of the bridge, the aircraft shifted to an outer security ring and focused their eyes on major avenues of approach to deny enemy counterattack forces from affecting bridge crossing operations.

The fast-paced operational tempo required the battalion to be continually postured to launch an Apache company within a 30-minute window, from the start of the ground war through the duration of combat operations culminating in the seizure of Saddam International Airport. We maintained a standing “be prepared” mission to conduct security in support of contingency operations for the duration of the war. In addition, the battalion routinely provided security for MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation aircraft that transitioned between the front and ambulatory exchange points. We also supported downed aircraft recovery teams or immediate personnel recovery missions in support of the Aviation Brigade.

For sustainability and depth, we maintained the next-up company on a two-hour launch string, while keeping the third company down for future contingencies. During operational missions in support of a BCT in contact, the battalion conducted continuous rotations of two attack helicopter companies for six to eight hour blocks to support the ground commander’s fight against the Republican Guard Medina Division. Meanwhile, we retained the third company in a forward assembly area on a reduced readiness condition that afforded aircrews an opportunity to rest. This third company provided the battalion the flexibility to conduct subsequent contingencies in support of the division. When the battalion was not operationally controlled by a BCT, the attack companies rotated in eight-hour cycles on a 30-minute launch string over a 24-hour period to quickly respond to reconnaissance and security mission requirements, some of which required only one team of two AH-64Ds. Through this tactical employment methodology, we were always able to launch teams of Apaches to perform zone reconnaissance missions and security operations, and conduct close combat attacks in support of ground forces on call. Moreover, this eight-hour fighter management cycle by company provided responsive, sustainable support to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), where continuous operations and on-station times far exceeded the requirement for mass throughout the war.

In the weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the battalion worked in concert with each BCT to test and validate combat and thermal identification panels (CIP/TIP) with the primary objective of mitigating the risk of air-to-ground fratricide during close combat operations. The CIP and tip integration on combat vehicles and our weapons tight philosophy resulted in zero air-to-ground fratricide incidents in the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) battle space. However, the Apache’s current forward-looking infrared (FLIR) provides target identification, even with CIPs and TIPs, out to only 3.0 kilometers, well short of its point target killing range. Fielding the latest generation FLIR, a must-have for the Longbow Apache to identify targets beyond 3.0 kilometers and further mitigate air-to-ground fratricide, and integrating two-way, real-time friendly blue icons onto a moving map display on the Longbow’s tactical situation display, will further enhance the Longbow Apache’s role in the close fight in the next war. Whether in shaping the battle in a combined arms War-fighter-type fight where intelligence of the enemy is known, or by conducting close combat attacks in direct support of a ground commander, the Longbow Apache provides significantly increased flexibility and firepower for U.S. Army forces, and will do so for years to come.

MAJ. DAVID J. RUDE is assigned to the 1st Battalion (Attack), 3rd Aviation Regiment, where he served as the battalion S-3 operations officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was commissioned in the Aviation branch through the ROTC Green-to-Gold program at Cameron University, Lawton, Okla. LT. COL. DANIEL E. WILLIAMS is the commander of 1st Battalion (Attack), 3rd Aviation Regiment, home stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga. He is a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and was commissioned into the Aviation branch.

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